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Despite containing numerous wealthy geographic areas, the state of Connecticut 
continues to struggle with social and economic distress, along with gun-related crime.  Problem 
analysis in urban areas revealed a critical need for services aimed at deterring violent and gun-
related crime in two target populations: serious juvenile offenders, aged 14-17 years old, and at-
risk youth, aged 11-13 years old. Using a quasi-experimental design, this study aimed to evaluate 
the effect of Project Safe Neighborhood (PSN) on youth in two cities in Connecticut. 
Implementation resulted in 133 young people receiving a variety of services in New Haven and 
Bridgeport. Evaluation research assessed intervention efforts designed to (1) build on the 
strengths and address the challenges of each juvenile offender, (2) expand community outreach 
and education efforts to reinforce and reward positive attitudes and behaviors surrounding “no-
gun policies,” and (3) utilize data-driven decision-making to guide program implementation and 
evaluate the results. Our findings suggest that youth who participated in Connecticut’s PSN 
youth initiative benefited from the services provided and exhibited a decreased involvement in 
the juvenile justice system following enrollment. 





Although overall violent crime and juvenile violent crime rates steadily declined 
following the early-to-mid 1990s, reducing levels of gun and gang violence in inner cities 
continues to be a focus of U.S. criminal and juvenile justice systems (Braga and Weisburd, 2012; 
Braga et al, 2018; Kennedy, 2009; McGarrell et al, 2013). To quell the previous youth violence 
epidemic, by the turn of the century almost every state in the U.S. enacted legislation that 
increased the penalties for gang-related offenses, therefore increasing the number of adolescents 
who entered the adult criminal justice system (Feld, 2017; Myers, 2005; Zimring, 1998). These 
laws relied heavily on deterrence to decrease youth gun violence, and they sometimes were 
combined with school and community prevention and intervention programs to discourage youth 
involvement in gang-related violence. To illustrate, Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) was 
initiated in 2001 by the U.S. Department of Justice, in conjunction with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 
nationwide, as a federally funded program designed to reduce gun and gang violence through 
interagency collaboration in local communities (Grunwald and Papachristos, 2017; McGarrell et 
al, 2010; Papachristos et al, 2007). In general, the PSN model was developed by combining 
similar policy interventions designed around focused deterrence and problem-solving strategies.  
Theoretically, the PSN model emphasizes deterrence and incapacitation through 
education and warning about federal and local criminal prosecution for illegal gun possession 
and violent, gang, and drug-related offenses involving a firearm (Kennedy, 1997; 2009). 
Consistent with the literature on deterrence (Nagin 2013; Paternoster, 2010; Zimring 1976), this 
model, through certainty, swiftness, and severity of punishment, should act to deter and, when 
necessary, incapacitate youth from committing violent gun-related crime. As a means of 
achieving these goals, PSN involves the collaboration of an interagency task force, including 
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local, state, and federal criminal justice agencies, together with community organizers, local 
service providers, and school-based programs. Ideally, these agencies will work together to 
communicate the model’s conceptual deterrence messages to youth and develop data-driven gun 
violence reduction strategies.  
A key component stipulated by the PSN model includes the specification of a local 
research partner to analyze levels of community gun violence, and together with the task force, 
provide a proactive plan for gun crime reduction (McGarrell et al, 2018). The research partners 
also are expected to provide ongoing assistance and evaluation of program effectiveness. The 
primary goals of the current evaluation were to assess implementation and outcomes achieved 
through Project Safe Neighborhoods in Connecticut, and to utilize research findings to enhance 
current and future PSN activities and outcomes.  
Previous Research 
During the past two decades, there has been a surge in the number of published studies 
and reports that explore the association between young urban minority males and gun violence 
(Dahlberg, 1998; Feld, 2017 Lizotte et al, 1996; Myers 2005). This research was prompted by 
the increasing number of youth homicides that occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
Researchers found that gang membership served as a critical determinant in the likelihood that 
young urban minorities will possess firearms and become perpetrators of violence, more so than 
other at-risk youth (MacDonald et al, 2005).  This pattern of gangs and gun violence was found 
in communities characterized by diminished economic opportunities and elevated levels of 
poverty, along with limited investment in schools, the health of the neighborhood, and general 
services for youth.   
Traditionally, the response to gangs and gang-related violence has been concentrated at 
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the local level.  However, more recently, community-based federal programs aimed at preventing 
youth from joining gangs have surged. In assessing localized homicide patterns and prevention 
strategies, Wilson, McDonald, and Tita (2010) concluded that programs developed around the 
specific strengths and weaknesses of local geographic conditions and with collaborative 
community partnerships are more successful at reducing gun violence. Programs such as 
Operation Ceasefire (Boston) and other contemporary “focused deterrence” interventions have 
used this approach to establish gun violence intervention strategies and evaluate reductions in 
gun crime and other outcomes, which helped shape the PSN model.  
Operation Ceasefire 
Implemented in Boston in the mid-1990s, Operation Ceasefire was designed to pair 
criminal justice agencies with local community groups to develop an individual-level 
intervention aimed at reducing gang violence and youth gun possession (Braga et al, 2001; Braga 
and Pierce, 2005; Kennedy et al, 1996, 2001).  The deterrent focus of Operation Ceasefire 
centered around the targeting of specific individuals and groups who were identified in the 
community as being high-risk for involvement in serious violence. Under this approach, 
Boston’s police force would assemble the city’s violent youth gangs and deliver the message that 
violent crime would be punished by all legally available means, a process known as “pulling 
levers.” The deterrence message was provided to a relatively small audience of gang members, 
thereby acting to “increase the certainty and severity of punishment, but only in targeted 
circumstances,” and in turn decrease levels of gang violence in Boston (Nagin, 2013, p. 210).   
Early research by Braga and colleagues (Braga et al, 2001) revealed a statistically 
significant decrease in the monthly number of youth homicides in Boston following 
implementation of Operation Ceasefire. The intervention also was associated with a significant 
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reduction in gun assaults and police calls for service. Subsequently, Braga and Pierce (2005) 
examined the impact of Operation Ceasefire on the illegal trade of new guns in Boston. For 5 
years prior to the 1996 implementation of the intervention, the percentage of traced handguns 
with a “fast time-to-crime” had been increasing steadily. Statistical analyses revealed a 
significant reduction in the use of fast time-to-crime handguns following program 
implementation, along with significant reductions in the average monthly percentage of all 
recovered handguns that were new, the average monthly percentage of all recovered youth 
handguns that were new, the average monthly percentage of illegal possession handguns that 
were new, and the average monthly percentage of all recovered crime handguns that were new. 
Based on the perceived success of Operation Ceasefire, other locations moved to 
implement and evaluate the pulling levers strategy. Similar supportive findings were uncovered 
in Indianapolis (Chermak and McGarrell, 2004; McGarrell et al, 2006; Corsaro and McGarrell, 
2009), Stockton, California (Braga, 2008), and Lowell, Massachusetts (Braga et al, 2008), with 
the intervention being associated with significant reductions in homicide, gun homicide, 
aggravated assaults with a gun, and gang homicide. More recent research by Braga and 
colleagues (2013, 2014) reevaluated Operation Ceasefire and found the intervention lead to a 
31% drop in the total number of shootings involving Boston gangs, and that total shootings went 
down for both targeted gangs and other gangs who took notice, suggesting a “diffusion of 
benefits” effect.  
Focused Deterrence   
 As the popularity and research on Operation Ceasefire grew, similar interventions were 
implemented across the country. “Pulling levers” initiatives gradually became known as 
“focused deterrence,” generally based on problem-oriented policing strategies that follow core 
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principles of deterrence theory and research (Braga and Weisburd, 2012; Braga et al, 2018; 
Kennedy, 2009; Nagin 2013; Paternoster, 2010). Under this approach, known offenders (such as 
youth gang members) are targeted and informed that continued criminal behavior will not be 
tolerated. They also are told how the criminal justice system and its personnel will respond to 
continued criminal behavior through use of all potential sanctions. Moreover, targeted 
individuals are provided with the opportunity for compliance rewards and social services, such as 
education and job training. In other words, focused deterrence strategies seek to enhance 
offender perceptions of the certainty, swiftness, and severity of punishment, while providing 
social service opportunities and potential rewards for law-abiding behavior. Interagency 
workgroups typically select a particular crime problem (e.g., youth homicide, drug trafficking, 
repeat violent offending), develop a plan for sanctioning and providing social services and 
community resources, and communicate with known and potential offenders to enhance 
understanding of why they are receiving special attention. 
 Continued research on pulling levers and focused deterrence has revealed positive 
findings in such locations as Chicago (Papachristos and Kirk, 2015), Cincinnati (Engel et al, 
2013), and New Orleans (Corsaro and Engel, 2015). Systematic reviews and meta-analyses, 
primarily by Braga and colleagues (Braga and Weisburd, 2012; Braga et al, 2018) have 
concluded that methodologically rigorous evaluations of focused deterrence interventions 
demonstrate an overall statistically significant, moderately sized crime reduction effect, 
suggesting these strategies should be part of a broader portfolio of crime interventions available 
to policy-makers and practitioners. This recommendation has been followed to a great extent, as 
focused deterrence has been incorporated into many federal funded initiatives, such as PSN. 
However, despite these positive findings and policy implications, there have been at least a few 
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studies that questioned the impact of Operation Ceasefire (Rosenfeld et al, 2005) or failed to 
uncover significant effects of focused deterrence on community level violence (Fox and Novak, 
2018) and gunshot wounds (Boyle et al, 2010).  
Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) 
 Originating in 2001, PSN is a nationwide, federally funded initiative that aims to deter 
and incapacitate violent offenders, through interagency collaboration, data-driven problem 
analysis and decision-making, and coordinated efforts directed at sanctioning and social services 
(Braga et al, 2006; McGarrell et al, 2010; Papachristos et al, 2007). In addition to the theory and 
research behind focused deterrence, PSN combines strategies and tactics from other empirically 
supported interventions, such as Project Exile (in Richmond, Virginia; Makarios and Pratt, 2012; 
Raphael and Ludwig, 2003; Rosenfeld et al, 2005) and the Strategic Approaches to Community 
Safety Initiative (SACSI; Coleman et al, 1999). Under SACSI, for example, evaluated sites often 
utilized offender notification meetings, media advertisement warnings about gun violence, and 
violent crime incident reviews as part of their overall strategic approach. New Haven, 
Connecticut, used a process whereby individual gun-related crimes were reviewed by a team of 
federal and local prosecutors and law enforcement, with the intention of deterring other violent 
offenders through providing more severe sanctions (Roehl et al., 2006). Under this approach, 
New Haven experienced a 32% decrease in violent gun crimes and a 45% decrease in calls-for-
service for “shots fired,” and other research established that communities introducing SACSI 
reported as much as a 50% decrease in gun violence (Hartstone and Richetelli, 2003).   
 Since 2001, PSN has provided over $2 billion in funding of local programming, coupled 
with increased federal prosecution of illegal gun use and possession (McGarrell et al, 2018). 
Funding is used to hire new federal and state prosecutors, support investigators, provide training, 
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deter juvenile gun crime, develop and promote community outreach efforts, and support other 
gun crime and gang violence reduction strategies. Each of the 94 U.S. Attorney districts are 
eligible to apply for PSN grants, which have generated a great deal of program implementation 
and corresponding evaluation research. In an initial national study, McGarrell and colleagues 
(2010) used a quasi-experimental design with longitudinal data from 2000-2006 to compare 
trends in violent crime in 82 large cities that implemented PSN with 170 large cities that did not. 
The findings indicated PSN target cities experienced significant reductions in violent crime 
compared to non-PSN cities, and the results were more pronounced when PSN was implemented 
with the most intensity and fidelity to the core PSN principles. Evaluation of PSN in Chicago 
(Grunwald and Papachristos, 2017; Papachristos et al, 2007) revealed similar supportive 
findings, as did a variety of documented PSN case studies and local level reports (McGarrell et 
al, 2018). Much of this latter research has not been published in academic journals, however. 
 Within this nationwide movement, beginning in 2002, Connecticut’s PSN program 
initially was developed and implemented to coordinate innovative and strategic responses to 
reduce violent gun crime in targeted communities. This effort focuses on three areas: 
1. Building on partnerships between federal, state, and local officials to aggressively 
enforce federal and state firearms laws; 
2. Fostering prevention and educational programming within school systems and 
community-based organizations to emphasize the deadly consequences of gun and gang 
violence, the need to refrain from illegal gun use, and the promotion of positive 
opportunities for youth and ex-offenders; and 
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3. Informing adult and youthful offenders, upon their release from correctional facilities, 
about the risks of joining street gangs and the consequences of illegally possessing 
firearms. (The United States Attorney’s Office, District of Connecticut, 2017) 
In 2012, as part of PSN in Connecticut, Project Longevity was created under the premise that 
violence can be reduced dramatically when community members and law enforcement join 
together to directly engage with known and potential offenders, while communicating a credible, 
moral message against violence; a credible law enforcement message about the consequences of 
further violence; and a genuine offer of help for those who want it. A partnership of law 
enforcement, social service providers, and community leaders was assembled to implement face-
to-face meetings with gang members, coordinate sanctioning and service-delivery, and collect 
and analyze data on crime hot spots and the effectiveness of interventions.  
 In 2014, The Justice Education Center, Inc., received further PSN funding to implement 
the Connecticut Project Safe Neighborhoods Youth Opportunity Initiative (PSN Youth) in the 
cities of Bridgeport and New Haven. The objectives of the initiative were to: 
1. Extend the work of Project Longevity to engage juvenile offenders (age 14-17).  
2. Offer individualized and comprehensive intervention plans, designed to build on the 
strengths and address the challenges of each juvenile offender.  
3. Expand community outreach and education efforts to children ages 11-13, to reinforce 
positive attitudes and behaviors and a personal commitment to the “no gangs, no guns” 
philosophy.  




The PSN Youth initiative initially sought to reach known juvenile offenders through “call-in 
sessions”, common in pulling levers and focused deterrence approaches. In addition to targeted 
deterrence, PSN Youth emphasized providing known offenders (aged 14-17) with prosocial 
support for making a choice to cease their criminal lifestyles, through intensive advocacy, 
mentoring, individual career plans, and technical education opportunities. PSN Youth also 
expanded community outreach and education efforts to reach a younger population of at-risk 
youth (aged 11-13).   
 The purpose of this study was to examine a somewhat unique PSN initiative, focused on 
both at-risk youth and known juvenile offenders. Although focused deterrence was a key aspect, 
emphasis also was placed on community-based prevention and intervention efforts designed to 
provide positive alternatives and prosocial opportunities for behavioral success. Researcher 
involvement was intended to help guide program implementation, assess participant progress, 
and evaluate outcomes produced by the initiative. The following sections provide a more detailed 
description of PSN Youth, the evaluation results, and policy implications.  
PSN Youth in Connecticut 
Despite having one of the highest median household income levels in the country, some 
of Connecticut’s population of nearly 3,600,000 continues to face extreme poverty, particularly 
in two of its major cities, Bridgeport and New Haven (American Community Survey, 2017). As 
shown in Table 1, social and economic disparity remains high in Bridgeport and New Haven, as 
compared to the state and nation as a whole.  In these two cities, minority groups members 
(based on race and ethnicity) are highly over-represented, although the percentage of the 
population under the age of 18 is similar to that of the state and nation. All economic indicators 
suggest lower levels of wealth in Bridgeport and New Haven, along with lower levels of health 
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insurance and household availability of computers and broadband internet. Educational 
attainment also is lower in the two target cities, while unemployment and poverty is higher. In 
sum, children and youth living in Bridgeport and New Haven experience a variety of social and 
economic risk factors associated with delinquent and violent behavior (Dahlberg, 1998; Feld, 
2017: Lizotte et al, 1996; MacDonald et al, 2005; Myers 2005). 
Connecticut’s juvenile offender population is divided into youth supervised by juvenile 
probation, which is handled by the Judicial Branch’s Court Support Services Division (CSSD), 
and youth in placement or on aftercare supervision under the umbrella of the Department of 
Children & Families (DCF). In recent decades, Connecticut’s juvenile justice system has 
experienced significant reform, resulting in dramatic reductions in juvenile commitments to 
secure facilities, increased use of diversionary programs, and declines in recidivism (Ma et al, 
2018). Moreover, in recent years, greater attention has been given to the behavioral health needs 
of youth, truancy reduction, the school-to-prison pipeline, data collection, youth tracking 
systems, and community-based services. 
Despite these positive trends, available data suggest some troubling juvenile crime 
indicators in Connecticut, particularly for certain cities. To begin, Sickmund and Puzzanchera’s 
(2014) comprehensive analysis of juvenile justice data revealed Connecticut to be above national 
averages in the proportion of high school students reporting they carried a weapon to school, 
used alcohol on school property, used marijuana on school property, and were offered, sold, or 
given illegal drugs on school property. In addition, Connecticut’s juvenile violent crime arrest 
rates were near the national average, although juvenile property crime arrest rates were 
noticeably lower. As shown in Table 2, Connecticut data from 2014 indicate the rate of arrest for 
juveniles in New Haven and Bridgeport was approximately 3.0 to 4.6 times higher than the rest 
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of the state. Finally, Connecticut Juvenile Court Data from 2014 are summarized in Table 3. 
These figures suggest the cities of New Haven, Hartford, and Bridgeport stood out, at the time 
PSN Youth was initiated, in terms of petitioned and non-petitioned delinquency cases, as well as 
non-petitioned status offenses (Hockenberry et al, 2018). It should be noted that the City of 
Hartford originally was to be part of PSN Youth, but due to failing to meet early requirements 
for implementation, was not included in the funded program. 
Program Design and Implementation 
Based on the juvenile data presented above, there was a clear need for an intervention 
aimed at deterring New Haven and Bridgeport youth from violent crime and other forms of 
delinquency, while providing an opportunity for receiving social services and achieving 
prosocial behavioral outcomes. In 2014, Connecticut PSN Youth was organized with a task 
force, consisting of agencies from both New Haven and Bridgeport, to support delinquency 
prevention and gun violence reduction efforts for at-risk youth and known offenders in the two 
cities. Task force members included representatives from the following organizations: 
• Connecticut Board of Education 
• Bullard-Havens Technical High School 
• Connecticut Business and Industry Association  
• Eli Whitney Technical High School 
• Integrated Wellness Group  
• New Haven Office of the Mayor 
• The Charter Oak Group (research partner)  
• The Justice Education Center, Inc. (TJEC) 
• University of New Haven (research partner) 
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• U.S. Attorney’s Office  
• Workforce Development Board in Bridgeport 
• Youth STAT Youth Services Program 
As research partners for the project, personnel from The Charter Oak Group and the 
University of New Haven collaborated on data collection and analysis. Representatives of the 
research team regularly attended task force meetings (typically held quarterly) and youth call-in 
sessions, conducted interviews with service providers, and reviewed available program 
documentation and quarterly reports. The Charter Oak Group was responsible for collecting and 
maintaining data on all PSN Youth participants. Cleaned and deidentified data later were 
provided to University of New Haven researchers for analysis and dissemination of findings. 
The initial design of Connecticut’s PSN Youth involved three cites, New Haven, 
Bridgeport, and Hartford, with each expected to have approximately 50 youth participants per 
year, totaling 300 participants during a 2-year grant period. When Hartford failed to meet 
specific requirements for implementation and was dropped from the funded program, resources 
were directed to the New Haven and Bridgeport jurisdictions. 
Like other PSN initiatives and focused deterrence strategies, Connecticut’s PSN Youth 
focused on the idea that increasing the perceived likelihood of arrest and prosecution for gun 
offenders will reduce gun crime, through deterrence of potential and known offenders.  Initially, 
regularly scheduled call-in sessions aimed to alert participating youth that gun-related offenses 
will be prosecuted fully. PSN Youth originally sought call-in referrals from probation and police 
departments, and occasionally other agencies, like the Department of Children and Families 
(DCF).  The youth call-in process was designed to both emphasize deterrence and provide 
opportunities for services within the community. Initial referrals were anticipated to produce 42 
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youth for intensive services.  These services entailed program staff conducting a risk assessment, 
identifying needed services, and developing an individualized service plan.   The primary 
recommended service typically was Career Pathways, with 15 slots per year allotted for 
vocational training through this program. Other services included summer school, referrals to 
Youth Stat (a local delinquency prevention program), case management, resume writing, job 
shadowing, and credit recovery.   
Early in the program, it became apparent there was some difficulty identifying enough 
“justice-involved youth” (i.e., known juvenile offenders) for the program.  Therefore, to fill the 
allotted spaces, the definition of “justice-involved” was revised to include “at-risk” youth who 
were distinguished through school attendance records, suspensions/expulsions, and class reading 
proficiency.  The primary referral source subsequently changed from probation to schools. This 
change and expansion of the target population makes PSN Youth different from the original 
Operation Ceasefire model and other similar focused deterrence strategies, but similar to other 
evidence-based approaches that emphasize risk assessment, matching youth to services based on 
risk and needs, data-driven decision-making, inter-agency collaboration, and program evaluation 
(Howell et al, 2014; Lipsey et al, 2010; Myers, 2013; Seigle et al, 2014).   
Youth Call-In Sessions 
PSN Coordinators from TJEC, with the help of local probation offices, school teams, and 
the Youth Stat initiative in New Haven, worked to engage known juvenile offenders and at-risk 
youth for PSN Youth programming. A small number of youth who were victims of crime, but 
believed to be at-risk for offending, also were included (e.g., known gang members who were 
victimized and believed to be at-risk for retaliatory or future crime). Once identified, youth were 
invited to voluntary call-in sessions with their parents. Parents were included primarily for 
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younger at-risk youth, in an effort to enhance family engagement in social services and 
educational programming. Call-ins took place at a local courthouse, a school, or a specific 
program location. These meetings typically were held with the following representatives in 
attendance: a federal prosecutor, a local prosecutor, the PSN coordinator, and local community 
members having alternatives and opportunities to offer to youth. At most call-ins, a local police 
officer and a community member who was once a gang member also were present to speak with 
the youth. Figure A illustrates call-in session goals. 
The sessions began with a brief introduction by the PSN Coordinator, followed by youth 
hearing from federal and state prosecutors. Prosecutors discussed what can happen to youth if 
they commit (or are with people who commit) crimes involving guns or drugs. Prosecutors often 
were followed by a police officer offering positive messages regarding the opportunity to 
succeed, and a community member encouraging youth not to make the same mistakes he made. 
It should be noted that this part of the call-in session was not a “scared straight” type strategy, as 
the community member (usually an ex-gang member) was not being confrontational or 
threatening, but rather positive and engaging. Youth also were able to hear from other 
community members, social service providers, and therapists who had various services and 
opportunities available, ranging from vocational training programs, mentoring, job prospects, 
mental health programs, and other prosocial activities.  
At the call-in sessions, after all speakers completed their messages, youth were 
encouraged to ask questions of prosecutors, community outreach members, service providers, 
and anyone else attending the session. A form then was distributed to all youth to complete and 
return to the PSN Coordinator, identifying what programming they were interested in attending. 
Immediate access to PSN Youth was available at the call-in sessions, but all youth received a 
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follow-up contact (either by phone or in person) to further discuss and determine the best 
opportunities for them individually. Not all youth who attend a call-in will received personalized 
services, but efforts were made to serve all participating youth. 
Assessment 
Upon identification of a youth as a PSN Youth participant, he or she was referred to the 
Integrated Wellness Group for a Post-Secondary Success (PSS) Screener.  A member of the 
Integrated Wellness Group completed the PSS Screener with the youth and recorded the score 
the youth received. In addition, for each participant, the Integrated Wellness Group also 
completed a Test for Adult Basic Education (TABE) and provided the results to the PSN 
Coordinator, along with the PSS screener score.  Additionally, four members of TJEC were 
trained in January 2016 on the PSS Screener and on TABE administration. Starting in February 
2016, TJEC staff administered all PSS and TABE assessment. 
Youth Stat 
Youth Stat is a school-based intervention program in New Haven, which seeks to reduce 
justice involvement and improve health and wellness outcomes of students from elementary to 
post-secondary education (https://www.newhavenct.gov/gov/depts/youth_services/stat.htm). The 
goal of this initiative is to enhance school engagement and academic performance among 
program-involved youth.  Youth Stat identifies youth and connects them to a network of services 
that are specifically targeted to their individual needs, which includes but is not limited to: 
tutoring, academic support, gang intervention, mental health assessment and treatment, and 
employment matching and placement. Youth Stat services were limited to PSN participants in 




Career Pathways Technology Collaborative 
In collaboration with Youth Stat, New Haven and Eli Whitney Technical High Schools 
introduced a program that provided various levels of support to ensure motivated students are 
offered technical skills, training, and academic tutoring to achieve success. Services include 
education in essential reading, writing, and math skills; training in the fields of 
Carpentry/Weatherization, Plumbing, Manufacturing, and Culinary Arts; and certifications for 
OSHA-10, CPR/First Aid, ECHO (Empathy, Character, Hope, and Opportunity) Personal 
Growth, and Youth Employment Skills. 
Media Outreach Campaign 
Finally, PSN Youth also partnered with local radio station WZMX Hot 93.7 and 
television channel WTIC Fox 61 on a media outreach component, advertising the program to 
Connecticut residents in the target areas of Bridgeport and New Haven.  Those respective 
campaigns produced the results shown in Table 3.  
Evaluation Results 
Data were collected by the research team through meeting records and observations, 
assessment results, records and interviews obtained from service providers, and direct 
observation of call-in sessions.  Additionally, official delinquency data for New Haven and 
Bridgeport youth were obtained from CSSD for analysis. Given limited resources, the primary 
focus of this evaluation included the tracking of activities as described above and completing 
corresponding statistical analysis.  Resource constraints did not allow for a randomized or 
matched control group of youth who did not receive PSN services. Funding for this program was 
provided through a PSN implementation grant, not a research grant, and there were no plans in 
the grant proposal or funding in the grant to conduct a randomized experiment or even a quasi-
19 
 
experimental study with a matched comparison group. Data were limited to those youths who 
were enrolled in PSN programming in either New Haven or Bridgeport and received services 
between 2014 and 2016.   
Results 
The served target population included 133 youth between the ages of 13 and 19 years old, 
with the average age of participants at the start of the program being between 16 and 17 (mean = 
16.51). The 133 participating youth were far fewer than the 300 youth originally planned for the 
program. This was due mainly to the City of Hartford being dropped from the project, along with 
unexpected difficulty in enrolling known offenders in PSN Youth programming. Other 
descriptive statistics for program participants appear in Figure B and Table 4. New Haven 
enrolled a larger number of youth in year 1, while Bridgeport had a larger number of program 
participants in year 2. About 75% of participating youth were male, with a slightly higher 
percentage in New Haven. Over 90% of PSN Youth participants were Black, again with a 
slightly higher percentage in New Haven. More than half of the total youth were Hispanic, with 
over 90% being Hispanic in Bridgeport. Overrepresentation of Black and Hispanic youth 
corresponds with the demographic characteristics shown in Table 1. Finally, over 75% of PSN 
Youth participated initially participated in a call-in session, and over 80% completed an initial 
interview with the PSN coordinator. To clarify, some youth were interviewed without having 
attended a call-in session, and some youth attended a call-in session but did not complete a 
subsequent interview.  
Outcomes of PSN Youth programming are presented in Tables 6 and 7.  As shown in 
Table 6, 56 youth completed an OSHA-10 (Occupational Safety and Health Administration 10-
hour training) certificate, 35 completed CPR training, and 11 completed Serv Safe (food and 
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beverage safe handling) training. Larger numbers of participants completed a certification in 
New Haven than in Bridgeport. In addition, as presented in Table 7, 70 PSN Youth participants 
successfully completed Career Pathways, 94 earned credits toward high school graduation, and 
28 graduated high school. Thirty-eight youth completed a summer program offered by TJEC in 
New Haven, and 90 participants produced a resume. Several of the program outcomes had higher 
achievement frequencies in New Haven, while several others were split roughly equally between 
the two locations. 
In addition to program outcomes, five official outcome measures of delinquency were 
obtained from CSSD and coded dichotomously (yes, no): Justice involvement since enrollment 
(i.e., having a juvenile court record since enrollment); Arrest at 6 months post enrollment; Arrest 
at 12 months post enrollment; Readjudicated at 6 months post enrollment; and Readjudicated at 
12 months post enrollment. A measure of youth who were justice involved prior to enrollment 
(i.e., having a juvenile court record prior to enrollment) in the PSN Youth initiative also was 
obtained.  As shown in Table 8, nearly half of program participants exhibited prior justice 
involvement, with nearly equal percentages in the two locations.     
Of the 133 youth were recruited to take part in the PSN intervention, 64 (48%) had 
juvenile justice system involvement prior to enrolling in the program. This included 28 (47.5%) 
youth from Bridgeport and 36 (48.6%) from New Haven. Following the PSN intervention, the 
total number of youth with justice involvement since enrolling in the program decreased to 45 
participants (33.8%). A McNemar's test determined that the difference in the proportion of 
justice involved youth pre- and post-intervention was statistically significant (p < .01).  Similar 
results were produced for both New Haven and Bridgeport youth, although recidivism was 
generally lower in Bridgeport, and the difference in pre- and post-intervention justice 
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involvement was slightly greater in Bridgeport (p < .05) as compared to New Haven (p < .10). 
Although these figures do not control for time at risk in the pre- and post-intervention periods (as 
well as other possible confounding factors), they suggest that participating youth benefited from 
the PSN intervention. In addition, arrest and adjudication figures in the 6 and 12-month time 
periods are relatively low, considering PSN youth typically are higher in risk and needs than the 
overall Connecticut youth population. 
Table 9 focuses on the PSN Youth participants with prior juvenile justice system 
involvement. Of those 64 participants with prior involvement, there were 38 (59%) with justice 
involvement following enrollment, of which 14 (50%) were from Bridgeport and 24 (67%) were 
from New Haven.  Eighteen (28%) were arrested within 6 months of enrollment, and 11 (17%) 
were readjudicated within 6 months.   Thirty-one (48%) were arrested within 12 months, and 20 
(31%) were readjudicated within 12 months.  The rates for New Haven participants were higher 
than Bridgeport at 6 months; the reverse was true at 12 months. 
Six-month rearrest rates for those PSN Youth participants with prior justice involvement 
(28%) were encouraging and were lower than six-month rearrest rates for all youth referred to 
juvenile court in the state of Connecticut in 2016 (31%; The Charter Oak Group, 2017).  The 12-
month rearrest rate (48%) for PSN Youth participants was slightly higher than the overall 12-
month rearrest rate for all Connecticut youth referred to juvenile court in 2016 (44%). Given that 
PSN youth often experience multiple risk factors and present high needs, this 12-month rearrest 
rate comparison is not surprising.  Six and twelve month readjudication rates for PSN youth 
(17% and 31%, respectively) are perhaps less encouraging, and these figures suggest the need for 




Discussion and Conclusions 
In recent decades, as a response to nationwide concern over gun and gang violence in 
many urban areas, numerous criminal and juvenile justice initiatives have sought to increase the 
perceived certainty of prosecution and incarceration, while providing alternatives and 
opportunities for prosocial services and behavioral success. Beginning with Operation Ceasefire, 
pulling levers and focused deterrence strategies have used interagency collaboration to provide a 
uniform message that violent crime will be punished by all means legally available, and social 
services are available to assist those who choose a law-abiding path to behavioral success. 
Fueled by supportive research findings in a variety of locations (see, e.g., Corsaro and Engel, 
2015; Engel et al, 2013; Papachristos and Kirk, 2015), along with the results of comprehensive 
meta-analyses (Braga and Weisburd, 2012; Braga et al, 2018), PSN is a federally funded 
initiative based on targeted deterrence, interagency collaboration, data-driven problem analysis 
and decision-making, and coordinated efforts directed at sanctioning and social services (Braga 
et al, 2006; McGarrell et al, 2010, 2018; Papachristos et al, 2007).     
The Connecticut PSN Youth initiative is unique in that it included both at-risk youth and 
known juvenile offenders, including some at younger ages. Following initial call-in sessions, 
which included deterrence-based messages from justice system professionals, efforts were placed 
on assessing participants and matching them with a variety of social service and educational 
programs. Of the 133 PSN Youth participants, 94 (71%) received credits toward graduation, 90 
(68%) competed resumes, 70 (53%) completed the Career Pathways program, 56 (42.1%) 
received OSHA-10 certification, 35 (26.3%) received CPR certification, and 28 (21%) graduated 
from High School (many were not ready or old enough to graduate). 
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In addition to positive program outcomes, recidivism analysis also suggested beneficial 
effects from the intervention. There was a statistically significant reduction in juvenile justice 
involvement when comparing the pre- and post-enrollment time periods for all PSN Youth 
participants, with supportive findings in both Bridgeport and New Haven. Six and twelve-month 
arrest and adjudication rates were relatively low, particularly for those youth without prior 
juvenile justice system involvement. Recidivism findings were not as encouraging for program 
participants who had prior justice involvement, perhaps indicating a need for more intensive and 
sustained services for these youth.  
 Overall, the findings suggest that when deviating from the standard Operation Ceasefire 
or focused deterrence approach (in this case by including at-risk youth and focusing more on 
educational and vocational opportunities), supportive results can be obtained, but greater 
attention should be given to established evidence-based programs and practices (Howell et al, 
2014; Lipsey et al, 2010; Myers, 2013; Seigle et al, 2014). Connecticut’s PSN Youth initiative 
utilized such evidence-based practices as risk assessment, matching youth to services based on 
risk and needs, data-driven decision-making, inter-agency collaboration, and program evaluation. 
It appears, however, that medium and higher risk participants (particularly those with prior 
juvenile justice system involvement) may not have received empirically supported services of 
satisfactory intensity and duration. In addition, although data collection and monitoring were 
included in PSN Youth, more rigorous program evaluation was not part of the funding or 
implementation plan, which points to the research limitations inherent in this study. 
 To begin, funding, time, and data limitations did not allow for a randomized experiment 
or even a matched comparison group design. The reported evaluation findings are mainly 
descriptive, with a before and after statistical comparison of juvenile justice system involvement. 
24 
 
Although the results are generally positive, methodological limitations limit the strength of the 
conclusions and implications that can be formed. However, when combined with previous 
findings obtained through more scientifically rigorous studies of focused deterrence and PSN, 
the results of this study add to a fairly large body of empirical support. 
 This study also relied primarily on available program documentation, official measures of 
recidivism, and direct observation of call-in sessions. Survey data and qualitative interviews of 
program participants and various stakeholders would be two ways to enhance the scope and 
depth of the evaluation findings, by generating more extensive information on the perceptions, 
experiences, and behaviors of these individuals. In addition to measuring and assessing program 
fidelity through these data sources, they may also be better at determining the causal mechanisms 
associated with focused deterrence and PSN initiatives. In other words, the current body of 
research indicates these approaches “work,” but we do not know as much about why they work. 
It could be, for example, that targeted deterrence has direct effects on behavior, indirect effects 
through certain social services and prosocial activities, or some combination of both. Survey and 
qualitative data would be beneficial in understanding these possible causal mechanisms.   
Based on the findings of current and past research, along with the research limitations 
noted above, efforts to continue and enhance PSN Youth and similar initiatives should assess 
whether planned and implemented services are in line with evidence-based programs and 
practices, particularly for medium and higher risk youth (including those with prior juvenile 
justice system involvement). Participants should be tracked from call-in sessions through 
program completion and beyond, to measure and asses a variety of process and behavioral 
outcomes.  When possible, more scientifically rigorous program evaluation should occur, but 
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additional forms of data collection also can enhance understanding of program implementation 
and effectiveness, even when experimental design is not possible. 
As supported by prior research, ongoing efforts should be made to engage youth with 
prior justice system involvement. While serving at-risk youth is important as well, their risk 
levels and needs may be different from those of known offenders, and mixing these youth during 
programming actually could increase the likelihood of delinquent behavior by lower-risk youth 
(Howell et al, 2014; Lipsey et al, 2010; Myers, 2013; Seigle et al, 2014). Moreover, rearrest and 
readjudication figures at 12 months, particularly for youth with prior justice system involvement, 
suggest programs should emphasize longer-term programming and follow-up services, again 
based on risk and needs. The current analysis of Connecticut’s PSN Youth provides a first step 
for evaluating this initiative, but further research should examine ongoing and modified aspects 
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Table 1: Demographic, Social, and Economic Characteristics of PSN Youth Cities (2017) 
Variable Bridgeport New Haven CT US 
Population 147,586 130,884 3,594,478 321,004,407 
% Population Nonwhite 59.6% 57.0% 23.3% 27.0% 
% Population Hispanic 39.2% 30.4% 15.4% 17.6% 
% of population under 18 23.7% 22.1% 21.2% 22.9% 
Households 50,341 49,987 1,361,755 118,825,921 
Median Household Income $44,841 $39,191 $73,781 $57,652 
Median Family Income $50,356 $46,671 $93,800 $70,850 
Per Capita Income $22,806 $24,688 $41,365 $31,177 
Median Housing Value $170,300 $189,400 $270,100 $193,500 
% Families in Poverty  17.5% 20.4% 7.0% 10.5% 
% Under 18 in Poverty 30.5% 33.6% 13.5% 20.3% 
% Food Stamps 28.01% 26% 12.4% 12.6% 
% No Health Insurance 16.2% 10.3% 6.4% 10.5% 
% Computer Households 83.4% 80.2% 88.2% 87.2% 
% Broadband Households 74.6% 71.1% 82.1% 78.1% 
Population 25 Years Old+ 94,935 81,047 2,480,297 216,271,644 
% High School Graduates 75.6% 84.6% 90.2% 87.3% 
% College Graduates 18.1% 33.9% 38.4% 30.9% 
Population 16 Years Old+ 116,323 105,046 2,928,091 255,797,692 
% Unemployed 13.8% 10.4% 7.2% 6.6% 




Table 2:  Juvenile Arrests, ages 13-17, 2014 
 







Juvenile Arrests for Violent Crimes 77 41 396 599 
Juvenile Arrest Rate per 100,000 
Violent Crime 
654 434 143 173 
Ratio to Balance of State 4.6 3.0 1.0 1.2 

















Bridgeport 772 581 102 540 
Danbury 152 243 8 232 
Hartford 1,073 695 5 503 
Middletown 332 251 22 243 
New Britain 444 481 * 432 
New Haven 1.339 503 * 389 
Rockville 342 264 * 158 
Stamford 246 227 5 189 
Torrington 191 203 * 125 
Waterbury 860 393 8 257 
Waterford 377 373 8 304 
Willimantic 264 206 5 198 
Total 6,392 4,400 176 3,570 
Note: Adapted from Hockenberry et al, 2018. 
* less than five offenses  
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Table 4: Media Campaign Results 
WZMX Hot 93.7 
• Reached 13.7% of residents in the 
Hartford/New Haven area on average 
2 times each. 
• Advertisement was heard 
approximately 260,500 times. 
• Ran in key areas, specifically morning 
and evening commutes.  
WTIC Fox 61 
• Reached 67.8% of residents in the 
Hartford/New Haven area on average 
2 times each. 
• Delivered 221 spots with $5,000 of 
added value. 
• Ran in all key areas including prime 
time, late news, and early morning 
news. 
• Advertisement was seen 





Table 5: Participant Characteristics (n=133) 




























46 (45.1%) 3 (9.4%) 43 (61.4%) 
Participant Site 
 
133 (100%) 59 (44.4%) 74 (55.6%) 
 




22 (78.6%) 24 (66.7%) 
Initial Interview 





Table 6: Certifications Received 
Certification Type Total Bridgeport New Haven 
OSHA 56 22 (36.1%) 34 (47.2%) 
CPR 35 N/A 35 (48.6%) 





Table 7: Process Outcomes  
Outcome Total Bridgeport New Haven 
Summer Program Completion 38 N/A 38 (52.8%) 
Career Pathways Completion 70 36 (59.0%) 34 (47.2%) 
Credits Toward Graduation 94 36 (59.0%) 58 (80.6%) 
Graduated High School 28 5 (8.2%) 23 (31.9%) 
Resumes Completed  90 47 (77.0%) 43 (58.1%) 













Justice Involvement Prior to Enrollment 64 (48.1%)a 28 (47.5%)b  36 (48.6%)c 
Justice Involvement Since Enrollment 45 (33.8%)a 17 (28.8%)b 28 (37.8%)c 
Arrested within 6 months 21 (15.8%) 6 (10.2%) 15 (20.3%) 
Adjudicated within 6 months 14 (10.5%) 3 (5.1%) 11 (14.9%) 
Arrested within 12 months 35 (26.3%) 15 (25.4%) 20 (27.0%) 
Adjudicated within 12 months 23 (17.3%) 9 (15.3%) 14 (18.9%) 













Justice Involvement Since Enrollment 38 (59.4%) 14 (50.0%)     24 (66.7%) 
Arrested within 6 months 18 (28.1%) 6 (21.4%) 12 (33.3%) 
Readjudicated within 6 months 11 (17.2%) 3 (10.7%)   8 (22.2%) 
Arrested within 12 months 31 (48.4%) 14 (50.0%) 17 (47.2%) 











•Locate youth for participation in the voluntary meetings through 
cooperation with local law enforcement and gang outreach workers to 
identify the individuals in the community who are most likely to be 
perpetrators or victims of violence.
2
•Call-In Sessions will convey a “Smart on Crime” message to encourage 
and incentivize youth to make the rights choices and to sensitize them to 
the consequences of both negative and positive choices.
3










New Haven Bridgeport New Haven Bridgeport
PSN Year 1 PSN Year 2
PSN Participants Per Site/Per Year
